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I  should like to thank you,  Mr.  Chairman,  for your invitation, 
your hospitality and your words of introduction.  I  am  very glad 
to be here tonight.  Especially for  two  reasons.  The first is 
that in the arguments  now  raging about protectionism,  we  are on 
the  same  side of the barricades.  We  export.  You  import.  So  we 
can stand together under  a  banner labelled IMPORTS  ARE  GOOD  FOR  YOU. 
And  to anyone who  asks whether we  in Europe  do  our share of 
importing,  I  would only point out that last year the Community 
bought $6  billion more of goods  from  the United States than we 
exported to you. 
The  second reason is that this is a  crucial year in the history 
of American steel imports.  The voices of protectionism are being 
heard more  loudly and more  clearly than for many  years.  And  they 
are talking about steel.  Steel is becoming  a  flashpoint of 
protectionism in dangerous  times.  So  I  think it a  timely 
privilege to be able to offer to this prestigious forum tonight ____  " _______ -------------
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some  reflections on all this from  a  European. 
Let me  do  so first against a  backcloth which extends  a  good deal 
more widely than steel.  It is sometimes  forgotten that in the 
1970s a  quiet,  but far-reaching revolution took place in the 
relationship between American business and  the outside world. 
For  something like 100  years after the Civil War  foreign trade 
never accounted for more  than  3  to 4  percent of the Gross 
National Product of  the United States.  For all these years 
the overwhelming majority of American businessmen  and  farmers 
could regard business abroad with  a  magisterial detachment. 
Then  in the 1970s the.picture began to change.  And  it changed 
fast.  Foreign trade now  accounts  for  something like 12  percent 
of United States GNP.  One-fifth of your industrial production 
is now  exported and two-thirds of your wheat.  Four out of  every 
five manufacturing  jobs created in the United States between 1977 
and  1980 were  linked to exports.  So  the foreigner is now  present 
invisibly,  but substantially in the American boardroom and on the 
American  farm.  And  you  can all judge not just as steel importers, 
but as American citizens and businessmen,  what would happen to 
American  jobs and  the American  standard of living if American 
foreign trade collapsed.  But that is precisely the danger 
conjured up by  the protectionist cries on steel. 
So let me  take in turn  some  of  the statements recently being 
made  by representatives of the United States steel industry. 
The first is the cry for protection.  It can all sound eloquently -3-
persuasive  "American steel producers must have  time to adjust 
to import forces  •••••  There is overwhelming  evidence that the 
market mechanism has  been  dismantled in overseas steel trade". 
All this could give the innocent observer the impression that 
the United States steel industry struggled gallantly for years 
without protection and after a  long period of battling heroically 
against overwhelming odds is now  reluctantly askingits due. 
All qf you here tonight know  that such  an  impression would  be-
very far from  the truth.  Let me  set the record straight. 
Item one.  Before the steel strike of 1959  opened  the way  to 
the first rush of purchases from  abroad  imports were negligible. 
But despite this there were still tariffs,which on  carbon  and  alloyed 
steel-ranged on  the-average  from  7  to 12.5 percent with peaks up 
to  24  percent. 
Item two.  Following a  steady rise in imports  during  the 1960s 
there came  the Voluntary Restraint Agreements with Japanese  and 
European exporters.  These  remained in force  from  1969  to 1974. 
Item three..  The Trigger Price System of famous  memory  put into 
effect in 1978  and  suspended for  some  seven months  in 1980 
following  the filing by  US  Steel of dumping  complaints against 
five European countries. 
Item four.  Reinstallation of.the Trigger Price System in 
October 1980,  but finally terminated in January 1982  when  US -4-
industry filed massive anti-dumping and countervailing suits 
against European  importers. 
Item five.  In 1982  the US-EC  Carbon Steel Arrangement  - after 
long  and difficult negotiation - entered into force after the 
withdrawal  of the petitions I  mentioned by  the  US  steel industry. 
But the history of protection of steel does not stop there. 
Item six.  Take  specialty steel.  From  1972 to 1974  this was  ~ 
brought into the Voluntary Restraint Agreements  negotiated for 
carbon steel. 
Item  seven.  From  October 1972 to 1977  there was  a  flat prohibition 
on  imports of specialty metals for  US  defence procurement.  A 
waiver was  subsequently introduced in late 1977  to allow imports 
from certain NATO  countries. 
Item eight.  From  June  1976 .to February 1980  import quotas were 
imposed under Section 201,  the escape clause of the Trade Act 
of 1974. 
Item nine.  In July 1983 yet more  import quotas  and  increased 
tariffs were  imposed under Section  201. 
Anyone  who  thought before hearing this catalogue that the United 
States steel industry had been gallantly bearing up  in a  bleak -s-
free trade environment should be  reminded of the  immortal  words 
of Lewis Carroll in the Hunting of the Snark: 
"But the principal failing occurred in the sailing 
And  the Bellman perplexed and distressed, 
Said he had hoped at least when  the wind blew East 
That the ship would not travel due West." 
But perplexed and distressed as the Bellman might be,  he might 
ask  a  question.  Why,  he might ask,  after this succession of 
protectionist measures is there a  cry for more protection? 
Being by  nature of  a  helpful disposition, let me  give some 
answers.  First the  "two wrongs make  a  right" fallacy.  Cries 
of righteous indignation about  subsidies by others have led to 
demands  for  increased protection.  This is a  dangerous  approach. 
The  proper answer to unfair practices lies within the normal 
trading rules and mechanisms which  provide in certain carefully 
defined cases for  compensation rather than any further infractions 
of these rules.  Secondly,  "much  wants more".  Protection 
encourages inefficiency and higher costs and prices.  Reduced 
productivity produces cries for more protection.  Protection 
resembles giving shots of red eye to somebody not noticeably on 
the wagon.  The more  you pour the more is demanded.  And  the more 
uproarious the demands  become.  The third point is more general. 
The  over-valued dollar results in calls for protectionism for  a 
wide  range of industries.  The dollar of  course is over-valued 
for other reasons.  But the initial effect of protectionist 
measures is to put further upward pressure on  the exchange rate. -6-
To  the extent to which the United States succeeds in cutting 
imports the trade balance  improves  and the currency strengthens 
further. 
Then  there are cries of complaint in particular about imports 
of steel from  developing countries.  As  I  said earlier, where 
these complaints are about subsidies there are rules which define 
clearly what can  and  cannot be done.  And  no reasonable person 
would  claim that imports  from these countries  should be  exempt 
from  the international trading rules.- Again we  are bound to be 
concerned in Europe when  we  see our exports to this huge market 
substantially curtailed while imports  from other countries are 
rising sharply.  But  I  detect in some  of the comments  on  imports 
from  developing countries a  more  radical  feeling.  A feeling that 
these countries have  no business to be exporting any  substantial 
quantities at all.  If this is the charge we  need to take into 
account  some  wider factors - commercial,  economic  and political. 
First commercial.  In 1982  just under  $120  billion of United 
States exports,  some  42  percent of the total, went to developing 
countries.  On  these purchases of American goods  some  6  million 
American  jobs depend.  How  are these countries supposed to pay 
for what they buy  from you?  Few  would argue that the American 
taxpayer  should pay for them.  But these countries need to earn 
foreign exchange.  Can  they do this if they are kept out of one 
of the biggest markets in the world? Then  economic.  This  country grew great on  change. 
States not only recognised it.  It pioneered change. 
The United 
Think of 
the Bell  telephone,  the Model  T,  the Bl7  and colour television. 
But the world in which you are now  year in year out much  more 
heavily involved is changing too,  more rapidly than ever before. 
And  there is no  international statute that says that production 
of steel  should be limited to the North American and European 
continents.  The  developing world is getting in on  the act,  just 
as they got into textiles in the 50s  and  60s  and  into radios in 
the 70s.  Can  we,  like King  Canute,  try and  stop the tide?  Or 
should we  not employ  the skill and  the inventiveness of the peoples 
of North America  and Europe  to move  into more  technologically 
advanced production,  both in steel and  elsewhere. 
Then political.  No  European  can in this city without emotion 
pass by Ellis Island and recall the words on the Statue of 
Liberty.  "Give me  your tired,  your poor, 
Your  huddled masses yearning to breathe free". 
For countless millions across the world this is part of the 
American  dream.  You  cannot bring the poor in as you did but you 
can still trade with them.  Is it seriously suggested that the 
fair-minded,  generous  and idealistic people of the United States 
should condemn  half the world to a  diet of  bananas,  and  junk the 
memory  of  the American dream? -8-
Mention of dreams  brings me  to economics because dreams  and 
economics often get mixed  up with unfortunate results for all 
concerned.  With American steel mills operating at well under 
60  percent of capacity cutting imports can  seem very attractive. 
But pause to think for  a  moment  of.the consequences.  Let us 
assume that by  some  stroke of .sinister magic all steel imports 
were eliminated.  Would  the problems of the American steel 
industry be  solved?  No,  without foreign  competition they would 
be  aggravated.  Plant modernisation,  already lagging behind that 
.. 
of  competitor countries,  would be further delayed.  Only  34  percent 
of steel produced in the United States is by continuous casting, 
the most  advanced  steelmaking technique,  compared with  82  percent 
in Japan  and  56  percent in the European Community.  The  Chairman 
of  a  major  US  steel firm estimated recently that one-third of the 
United States steelmaking facilities require modernisation. 
Without imports labour productivity would decline further and 
costs would  increase.  Already wage  rates in the steel sector 
are well  above  the average for manufacturing industry.  Prices 
would rise and  the rise in prices would have  an  adverse effect 
well  beyond the steel industry.  All  that wide range of domestic 
industries which use American steel would also lose 
competitiveness.  The great danger is that they  too would  then 
seek  increased protection.  And  all this would mean  retaliation 
against American exports which would inflict grave damage  on the 
American  economy. -9-
Let us  look for a  moment  more generally at the troubles of the 
steel industry.  Because these are not limited to the United 
States.  European industry faces very much  the  same  sort of 
problems.  That was  the background to the so-called OECD  steel 
consensus in 1977.  Then we  agreed  among  ourselves and with our 
OECD  trading partners that there was  on both  sides of the Atlantic 
a  massive task of readjustment but that we  would all of us tackle 
it in a  fair and  balanced way and not seek to export our problems 
backwards  and  forwards  across the Atlantic. 
Now  what has  the European  Community  done in terms of steel?  Have 
we  simply sat idly by and criticised American actions?  The  answer 
is no.  The  European steel industry has  taken over the last eight 
years  a  considerable battering.  Employment  in the Community's 
steel industry between 1974  and 1983  has been cut by  over one-third 
from  800,000 to less than  500,000  today.  This year  a  further 
25,000  jobs are expected to go and we  reckon that many  more  will 
be lost in the coming years.  Our total steel production has gone 
down  from  115  to 98  million tons.  These have reflected in the 
last couple of years Community  enforced cuts in steel production 
based on the powers  in the original Coal  and Steel Community 
Treaty.  Cuts which were  only agreed to after long  and painful 
discussion.  And  they also reflect some  tough decisions on 
subsidies.  Each  one has  in our  system to be  scrutinised and  agreed 
in Brussels.  None  have  been permitted since 1981 without being 
linked to reduction in capacity.  From  January 1986  our intention 
is to eliminate  them entirely.  You  may  ask  why  should subsidies -Iv-
be  given at all in Europe?  Let me  only say that on this side 
of  the Atlantic while Federal money  is not given to the u.s. 
steel industry through direct aid,  there are many  ways  by which 
the American steel industry receives benefits through the 
fiscal  system  such as accelerated depreciation allowances,  and 
some  years  ago  "safe harbour leasing".  In this connection I  may 
cite Mr.  de  Laney,  Chairman of Republic Steel who  stated on 
1  April 1982,  "the leasing provisions,  if unchanged,  could 
provide the steel industry with up to 500  million us  dollars 
for  investment in 1982".  And  the widespread and tough  reduction  \. 
in imports  embodied in our agreement on carbon steel last year 
is just as effective a  prop  and in economic  terms  no  more 
defensible. 
Let me  mention for  a  moment  - since they are often referred to -
the restrictions maintained by  the Community  on  imports of steel 
products.  Here  the record needs to be corrected.  The  Community 
and its Member  States maintain a  number of quantitative  import 
restrictions against steel from  the centrally planned  economies 
in Eastern Europe where,  as everybody  knows,  economic production 
and pricing conditions are peculiar.  There are no  such 
import restrictions from other sources. 
But the Community  does have to deal with imports  from other sources. 
This is what we  do.  The  Community  sets basic prices for  imports 
of the majority of iron and steel products similar to the well-
known  American  trigger prices.  These prices,  calculated from  the -11-
lowest normal  costs in supplier countries where  normal 
competitive conditions exist,  are  intended to serve as  a  bench 
mark  for the application of .the Community's  dumping regulations. 
An  under-quotation creates a  presumption of dumping or of  subsidy 
and  exposes  the supplier concerned to the.opening of an anti-
dumping or anti-subsidy inquiry.  These basic prices are 
periodically reviewed  to reflect changing cost patterns. 
As  an alternative to the basic price system,  the  Community  offers 
its suppliers  an  opportunity to negotiate bilateral arrangements. 
The  basic principle of these arrangements is to allow the 
signatory countries to maintain their traditional trade with the 
Community,  taking account of the developments  on  the  Community 
steel market.  Such  arrangements are negotiated on  a  year to year 
basis with  the steel suppliers which have opted for what are 
basically pricing and orderly marketing disciplines. 
The price advantages consist essentially in the non-application 
of the basic prices,  the renunciation by  the EC  of anti-dumping 
or countervailing actions,  a  penetration margin  on  Community 
producers delivered prices,  and  the prohibition on  Community 
producers  from aligning their prices on those offered by exporters 
in arrangement countries.  This penetration margin ranges  from 
3  to 6  percent.  In return the partner countries offer the 
Community  respect for traditional trade flows,  taking account of 
I 
the developments of the Community market for steel. 
These quantitative limits are not rigidly imposed  on our trading 
partners.  The limits give  them the assurance of stability in -12-
their continued access to the Community market.  But if they 
consider the  system of basic prices more  advantageous  they are 
always  free to switch back. 
So we  reckon that we  have played our part in the restructuring 
of steel on  both sides of the Atlantic.  We  also reckon we  have 
played our part in accepting last year  a  limitation of our steel 
exports to the United States.  This is a  view with which  the U.S. 
Administration agrees.  In his testimony before the International 
Trade  Commission  on October 26,  Lionel Olmer  said  "the 
arrangement was  structured in such  a  way  as to address the domestic 
industry's perceptions of  and fears  concerning harmful market 
behaviour while the EC  was  implementing its announced  programme 
of restructuring and  the gradual elimination of subsidies 
The  arrangement has been operating very well.  And  the EC  has 
demonstrated  a  serious commitment to its continued successful 
operation •••••  Comparing  the first eight months of 1983 with 
the first eight months of last year total u.s.  steel imports from 
the  EC  fell by  38  percent,  some  3.9 million to 2.4 million net 
tons.  Imports of products subject to the Arrangement licensing 
provisions fell from  2.2 million to 1.8 million net tons,  a 
decrease of  21  percent.  Over  the  same  two  periods of time EEC 
import penetration of the U.S.  market for total steel mill products 
fell from  7.42  to  4.64  percent while its market share for products 
subject to licensing declined from  6~31 to 4.56 percent". -13~ 
But still there are those who  are not satisfied.  The  call goes 
out,  as in the old song,  for madder music  and yet stronger wine. 
We  have  the anti-dumping case introduced by  the Gilmore  Company 
on hot rolled carbon steel plate from  Belgium and the Federal 
Republic of Germany  on which  the ITC  has  recently found  injury. 
We  think  that this petition is unfounded.  The petition was  not 
made  on behalf of the industry allegedly affected as required by 
Article 5(1)  of the GATT  Anti-dumping  Code.  Steels exports of 
the products concerned from  the Community  are made  in strict 
conformitywiththe provisions of  the EC-US  steel arrangement which 
was  accepted by  the great majority of  US  producers and which 
excludes  any  injury being caused to US  industry.  Not only,  as 
Lionel  Olmer pointed out,  have  we  fully respected all the 
provisions of the arrangement - as  shown  by  the fall in US  imports 
from  the EC  both absolutely and as  a  share of  the American market. 
In the  same  period imports  from other sources  (excluding  Japan) 
have  increased by  29.6 percent. 
Then  there was  the decision to impose additional penalties on 
imports of  specialty steel.  We  have disagreed with this decision 
for  a  number  of reasons.  The  US  Administration has  sought to 
justify this action under  the provision of  the international 
trading rules  (Article XIX  of  the GATT  dealing with  safeguard 
action on  imports of particular products).  But this Article can 
only be used if "any product is being  imported  •••••  in such 
increased quantities and  in such conditions as to cause or 
threaten serious injury to domestic producers".  We  hold that the -14-
causes of  the plight of US  specialty  .. steel producers are the  US 
recession and  the strong dollar and not imports from  the  Community 
which  amounted  to less than 10 percent of  the market. 
In 1982  the  consumption of  specialty steel in the US  went  down 
by  200,000  tons  and  imports went up  by  27~000 from all sources. 
This certainly caused  some  pressure.  But what about more  recent 
monthly figures.  Production in the last quarter of 1982  of  the 
items  covered by the tariff measures  recently taken was  140,000 
tons.  That was  certainly low.  For the first quarter of this  ~ 
year the figure was  204,000  tons,  the  second quarter 234,000  tons,the 
third quarter  291,000  ton~ about the traditional production of 
1  million tons  a  year.  Consumption is also going  up  and in June, 
July,  August it was  roughly 100,000  tons  a  month  compared with 
80,000  tons  in January and February.  So what is this talk about 
the industry  "remaining in depressed conditions".  There has been 
a  very significant turn around  since the last quarter of last 
year.  In recent months  the US  specialty steel industry has  been 
back where it was  before 1982  as far as production and  consumption 
are concerned.  But in the meantime  on the import side for the 
quota products the cut back is very  sharp and ranges  from  30  to 
40  percent as compared  to imports during the last three years. 
On  tariffs there is an extra 8  percent or 10  percent no less than 
a  doubling of the duties.  For high cost products that is not 
negligible. 
Let me  just ask·on this one  question and  signal one fact. 
How  is the pressure for  a  restructuring of the  US  industry going -Is-
to work  out if imports are either maintained at low levels 
(for the quota products)  or face punitive tariffs while domestic 
demand  rises sharply.  All this is more like Smoot  Hawley  than 
Adam  Smith. 
Then  the fact.  We  are still negotiating about the extent of the 
compensation which  according to the  GATT  rules is necessary for 
the u.s.  measures  on specialty steel.  We  have made  some  progress 
and we  hope that we  can reach agreement by  January 15.  If we  do 
not our Council of Ministers has decided thatrestrictions 
on  a  range of American exports to the Community will need to be 
introduced.  This  shows  that the points I  have been making  about 
the dangers of protectionism for American exports are not 
theorising but hard and dangerous reality. 
Then  there is talk of the across the board Section  201  application 
which  a  major steel producer is thinking of bringing to limit 
imports.  And  there is also the happy  news  of the introduction 
by  the members  of the House  Steel Caucus of a  Bill known  as 
"The Fair Trade  and Steel Act of 1983"  which would limit foreign 
steel imports to an  average 15 percent of the domestic market for 
a  five year period.  And  there is pressure for restriction of 
imports of pipes and tubes. 
Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  spoken of decisions and of plans  and proposals. 
They  add up to  some  menacing wolves  prowling round  the forest. 
They  show  that in the major sector of steel, which is 
your business,  there are  some  grave  threats to the one world \' 
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trading  system on  which the prosperity of the West has been based 
since the War.  And  these threats are not just to one sector 
of trade.  The protectionist bell does not toll for one.  It 
tolls for us all.  If we  were ever - which  I  do not believe -
to reach the stage of a  major escalation of .trade restrictions 
across the Atlantic then we  would rapidly find ourselves in the 
centre of  a  major  and  rapid unravelling of the GATT  system. 
American  exports - European exports - of farm products and 
manufactured goods alike - would  be hit.  And  we  account  between 
us  for one-third of world trade.  So  if this were  ever to happen 
then  the one world trading  system would  be bust.  And  we  would be 
back  to the wasteland of the thirties,  the years of stifling 
unemployment,  of hope  foregone,  of  "Buddy,  can you  spare a  dime" 
and  of all the terrible political ghosts which cluster in a  dark 
and hopeless  time. 
I  hope  and believe,  Mr.  Chairman,  that we  can together avoid 
these dangers.  But this will need  from both sides a  great deal 
of caution,  moderation and good  sense.  One  hundred  and  eighty-two 
years ago Thomas  Jefferson set out a  proud American tradition 
"peace,  conunerce,  and honest friendship with all nations".  I 
am  glad to salute tonight the role your Institute has played· 
in upholding this tradition and  I  wish it well  in holding the 
banner high  through  the difficult months  and years to come. 